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Chapter 4 ‘Now, back to our Virchow’:  German Medical and Political
Traditions in Post-war Berlin
In these current dark times there are still some rays of light for the German people—in spite of all errors and
crimes which have been perpetrated in their name—they are the rays of hope which arise from the unquenchable
spring of their intellectual and spiritual past.
As they arrived in Germany, the Allies were forced to rely on the cooperation of the German medical authorities.
While Chapter 3 looked at German émigrés, this chapter focuses on those German doctors and health officers who
never left the country, the large majority in the profession. How did they reflect on the events of the previous decade?
How did they present their careers and relate to their émigré compatriots, some of whom were now returning to
Germany, and the occupiers? This chapter focuses on Berlin, which became both the seat of the quadripartite Allied
Control Council (ACC) and the capital of the Soviet zone.
Most historians have now abandoned the once-popular idea of a ‘Zero Hour’ (Stunde Null) and a radical
transformation of German society after the end of the war. This chapter, too, shows that the break after 1945 was not
nearly as radical as many earlier studies claimed. Berlin is a useful illustration of the many continuities in health
administration and medical practice: old institutions remained essentially unchanged, individuals continued in their old
jobs, and long-acquainted groups and networks of German doctors survived intact. This continuity of personnel and
institutions was accompanied by proclamations about the importance of a number of positive German traditions, both
political and medical. But although continuity was an important feature of the reconstruction of the health service after
1945, there were fundamental disagreements within the medical profession about their history, their tasks, and their
future.
This chapter also throws light on the intellectual reconstruction of Germany after 1945. A number of studies have
investigated the complex identity politics in both German states after 1949. Mary Fulbrook, for example, has argued
that the ‘singing tales of heroes and martyrs’ was a crucial part of the construction of national identity in both
Germanies: ‘“good” traditions in the past had to be found and celebrated as forebears of the present, while those
responsible for the evils of Nazism had to be both identified and dealt with, both in reality (denazification,
restructuring) and in interpretation (the tales told about the nation's history)’.  As we will see, such a process also
occurred in medicine and public health, where heroes were indentified, German traditions recounted, and their
apparent antecedents and origins celebrated. The pathologist Rudolf Virchow (1821–1902) was celebrated by different
groups of medical officers, but for very different reasons. In the context of the post-war trials and debates about blame
for the war and defeat, celebrations of heroes helped to assert the value of ‘good’ German traditions in the past, and
thereby isolated the criminality of Nazi medicine.
The material presented here also helps us to understand the role of the occupiers’ presence in Germany after 1945.
German historians have, with renewed vigour after 1989, emphasized the permanence of German ideas and practices
from the nineteenth century to the post-war period. From them we know that after 1945 many German institutions
from the 1920s, the apparent heyday of public health, were recreated.  But even those scholars who specifically look at
the 1945–9 period tend to blank out the occupiers’ involvement in ‘German’ history. They concentrate exclusively on
German medical organizations and health personnel, without understanding the wider political context of the
occupation. They also often neglect to consider the role of national self-justification in the post-war debates.  This
chapter argues that the presence of the occupiers was an important stimulus for publicly voiced arguments on history
and precedents. Declarations on the viability and desirability of German traditions were often specifically targeted at
the Allies and German critics, to make the case that Germany was still a great nation with a role to play in the world.
Berlin housed two public health offices with different remits: one administered health work for the Soviet zone (the
Central Health Administration), the other operated as part of the city administration (the Health Department of the
Magistrat of Berlin). Both began to work shortly after the end of the war in offices in close physical proximity. While
elsewhere in Germany health committees were created as advisory bodies for the military governments with few
powers of their own (such as the British zone's Zonal Health Advisory Council, and the health group in the American
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officials, but had to liaise with the occupation authorities. Although both were appointed and endorsed by the Soviet
authorities, they had radically different political affiliations, outlooks, and ways of presenting their own past and the
future of German medicine.
The Magistrat of Berlin and the Berlin City Health Department
(i) Origins and Composition
The foundations for a joint occupation of Berlin were laid by the European Advisory Commission (EAC) in London
during the war, and many details, including a division into sectors (one for each of Britain, the United States, and the
Soviet Union), were agreed by autumn 1944. At the Yalta conference in February 1945 France was also given a share,
including its own occupation zone and Berlin sector. Berlin was thus designed to be a miniature version of the Allied
occupation of Germany: each of the occupiers was to administer one Berlin sector, and the four city commanders and
their staffs were to govern together in the Allied Kommandatura of Berlin. In practice, these arrangements were
complicated by the armies’ locations in early 1945. American and British troops were focused on combat in the north
and west of Germany, while the Red Army, coming from the east, was much closer to Berlin. By March 1945, in spite
of misgivings, the American and British governments agreed to let the Soviet troops conquer Berlin (the French were
in no position to prevent this), and to move into their own sectors later.  The Soviet Berlin offensive began in mid-
April 1945, and on 21 April they entered the northern and eastern suburbs. After intense street fighting, German troops
in the capital capitulated on 2 May 1945, followed a few days later by the formal surrender of the Wehrmacht in
Reims.
As a result, Berlin was under sole Soviet control from May until early July 1945. Until his death in a car accident on
16 June 1945, the administrative and political power for the city lay in the hands of the Soviet city commander, Nikolai
Berzarin, and his staff.  Soviet officers were allocated to oversee the re-establishment of administrations in each city
district. Under their watchful eyes, mayors and local councils (each with a health department headed by a medical
officer) were appointed. A city-wide council, the Magistrat, was established as the main city authority, to liaise with
and take orders from the Allied Kommandatura. When in July the British, French, and American forces finally moved
into their sectors and the Kommandatura took over, the German administration had already been up and running for
weeks. On 11 July 1945, the Kommandatura's first order specified that all previous Soviet arrangements for Berlin,
including the German appointments, were to stay in effect.  Berlin was governed in this way by both Allied
Kommandatura and German Magistrat (which from October 1946 contained elected officials) until summer 1948,
when clashes between the occupiers culminated in the Soviet blockade of Berlin and an end to quadripartite
cooperation.
Who was working at the Magistrat? The body's initial composition had its roots in the German Communist Party's
(KPD) preparations in Soviet exile. Of the three groups of German communists sent from Moscow to Germany in
spring 1945, Walter Ulbricht's was instructed, among other tasks, to find suitable officials for Berlin. Immediately after
their arrival in Berlin on 2 May, they went about finding candidates for the district councils and the Magistrat. General
guidelines worked out in Moscow specified that the new administrations were to contain a broad range of antifascists.
Communists were to take a significant part, but were to be joined by social democrats, liberals, and politically
acceptable ‘specialists’. One of the main selection criteria was a positive attitude towards working with the Soviet
authorities.
While to Ulbricht it was crucial that communists held key administrative positions (particularly those enabling the
control of personnel policy and education), other considerations prevailed for the Health Department. Ulbricht's first
contact was the well-known surgeon Ferdinand Sauerbruch. Even though Sauerbruch was ‘an old German nationalist’,
Ulbricht thought it ‘necessary first of all to create normal living conditions for the population here in Berlin and to
organize the health service. Later we can talk about our potential political differences.’  Sauerbruch agreed to
Ulbricht's offer, and, as a result of his recommendations, other health appointments targeted leading members of the
medical establishment, including Erwin Gohrbandt, director of the surgical department of the Robert-Koch Hospital,
and the senior civil servant and medical officer Franz Redeker.  The Health Department, and its contrast with other
Magistrat departments, tells us much about how public health and medicine were being approached by Ulbricht and the
Soviet authorities. While an immediate resumption of work was vital and time could not be wasted in the selection of
candidates, the choice of Sauerbruch and co. was hardly accidental. It proved highly beneficial to have the great
German surgeon on their side; his authority helped to recruit the medical establishment to the Magistrat's initiatives
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On 13 May 1945, Berzarin approved Ulbricht's selections to date. The opening meeting of the Magistrat's Constituent
Assembly took place a week later on 19 May, and its first official sitting the following day.  The Health Department
began to work immediately. In the bombed-out ruins of Berlin, its central task was to direct the district health offices’
urgent epidemic work. It was to organize vaccination and disinfection campaigns, and to regulate how officials were to
locate sources of infection, quarantine infected individuals, organize clean-up operations, bury corpses, record and
report disease and mortality statistics, and see that the rules were enforced. The Health Department was also to
supervise and approve the appointment of medical directors, consultants, and heads of departments at the Berlin
hospitals.  On 19 May, the Health Department called its first meeting with the district medical officers. The meetings
continued at roughly fortnightly intervals.
Soon two overlapping circles of people came together in the Magistrat's health work. First, a number of its leading
members were surgeons, internists, or pathologists who had trained and often worked for a long time at the prestigious
Charité Hospital in Berlin—some had international reputations in scientific research. Second, the Magistrat's health
office had among its ranks medical officers who had for many decades worked for the city health administration, most
of whose careers had flourished during the Nazi regime. It is worth dwelling on who these two sets of people were and
the connections that existed between them.
Chief among the Charité circle was Ferdinand Sauerbruch, a surgeon with an international reputation. By the time of
his appointment in 1945, he could look back on a long medical career. Born in 1875 in the Ruhr district, he studied
natural sciences at the University of Marburg before switching to medicine at the University of Leipzig.  In 1903,
after a period of private practice and junior surgical positions, he joined the surgical department at the University
Hospital in Breslau, where he began to specialize in thoracic surgery and carried out some pioneering experiments.
Surgical operations in the thoracic cavity had been considered impossible because of the air pressure involved, but
Sauerbruch devised a new method by surrounding the patient in an airtight container.  Sauerbruch's years in Breslau
were followed by stints at clinics throughout Germany and Switzerland. After the First World War, where he served as
an advisory surgeon to the German army, he became a professor at the University of Munich. In 1928 he received the
chair in surgery at the Charité and the University of Berlin, and his reputation continued to blossom, unimpeded by his
often conservative stance on surgical practice.  He became Hindenburg's personal physician and attended politicians
such as Hitler, Heydrich, and Mussolini. During the Second World War he worked as the Wehrmacht's surgeon-
general, and was a member of the scientific senate of the military medical service.
His fame had declined during the war in Britain and the United States, where surgical advances had made his methods
obsolete. Elsewhere, however, his name was unrivalled among living German surgeons. Particularly in the Soviet
Union he was still celebrated, and his presence impressed the Soviet officers stationed in Germany. General Kuznetsov
(head of the Health Department of the Soviet Military Administration in Germany (SMAG)) wrote to Marshall Zhukov
about the German scientific institutions and materials his department had studied. Kuznetsov noted that he had
informed the Soviet health ministry and the Academy of Sciences of ‘a series of valuable achievements presenting
interest to Soviet science’, and proposed the organization of teams of Soviet scientists to come to Germany to study
and ‘to master these methods and to transmit them to Soviet practice’. He highlighted Sauerbruch's surgical work as of
particular interest and importance.  In the course of the first post-war months, a string of Soviet officers of all ranks
consulted Sauerbruch and asked for help with illnesses their own doctors had not been able to cure. Under Soviet
protection, Sauerbruch received privileges such as a car, and food and drink, and apparently a sign was placed outside
his house which read (in Russian) ‘the great doctor Sauerbruch lives here’, as a safeguard against any molestation.
Sauerbruch, as one of the ‘grand old men’ of the Charité, was in friendly contact with other Charité veterans.  Many
of them had not left Berlin and still worked in the large hospitals in and around the city; through Sauerbruch's
influence they were co-opted into various jobs in the health administration. One such grand old man was the
pathologist Robert Rössle. A year younger than his old friend Sauerbruch, he had studied under Rudolf Virchow, and
from 1929 until 1948 held Virchow's famous pathology chair at the Charité. After 1945, he directed the Charité's
pathology clinic and the pathological institute at a hospital in Berlin-Tempelhof.  He also joined a series of health
committees and became secretary of the Academy of Sciences, but turned down the offer to work with Sauerbruch at
the Health Department because of his full workload.
Another member of this set was the internist Theodor Brugsch, who had trained and worked at the Charité until he
received a professorship in internal medicine in Halle in 1927. In 1935 he retired from his chair following a dispute
with his faculty, and returned to Berlin, where he opened a successful private clinic. In spite of his earlier clashes with
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Health Department was impressed by his reputation.  He was appointed to two positions: he ran the First Medical
Clinic of the Charité; and he became a vice-president of the Soviet zone's Central Education Administration, with
responsibility for the medical curriculum and medical faculties. In this second capacity he had to liaise with
Sauerbruch's department. Brugsch had first met Sauerbruch at a conference in 1922, and had maintained friendly
contact ever since.  Apart from a quarrel over the terms of Brugsch's reinstatement at the Charité, Brugsch later
thought that his cooperation with Sauerbruch after 1945 had been very successful.
Brugsch had in fact been asked to join the Central Education Administration by another acquaintance of this set: the
surgeon Erwin Gohrbandt. Born in 1890, Gohrbrandt completed his medical training at the Charité in 1914. After
service as an army medical officer in the First World War, he worked at the Charité's surgical clinic until 1928, when
he was appointed as consultant (and in 1933 chief consultant) at the surgical department of the Urban-Krankenhaus in
Berlin. From 1933 he also worked as a surgical consultant in the youth welfare service. In 1940 he became director of
the surgical department at the Robert Koch Hospital in Berlin-Moabit and professor of surgery at the University of
Berlin. After 1939 he also served as an advisory surgeon of the army, and then of the air force. In 1945 he joined the
Magistrat as Sauerbruch's deputy, and also continued to work at the hospital in Moabit. Later, he rejoined the
Charité.
There were a number of other medical officers at the Magistrat, younger and less well known, but comparable in their
training and career trajectories. Among them was Friedrich Schopohl, born in 1907, a gynaecological specialist at a
number of Berlin hospitals before joining the Charité gynaecological clinic in 1936. He seems to have been a member
of the National Sozialistische Deutsche Arbeiber Partei (NSDAP) for a year in 1930, and again from 1937 until 1945,
but was eventually cleared by a denazification tribunal.  In 1946, several years before he was cleared, he was made
chief consultant at the Charité's gynaecological clinic, and in 1948 was appointed as professor of gynaecology at the
University of Berlin. In 1945 and 1946 he was also co-opted to work with the Magistrat Health Department, for
example on a committee to formulate abortion policy.  Another example is Kurt Ballowitz, also born in 1907, who
was a consultant in internal medicine and an infectious disease specialist. In addition to his work as district medical
officer for Berlin-Mitte, he headed the Magistrat's sub-department on municipal sanitation and hygiene. In December
1945 he was appointed to the First Medical Clinic of the Charité.
These ‘grand old men’ and their junior colleagues were also joined by some experienced medical officers. Franz
Redeker, born in 1891, was recruited as a second deputy to Sauerbruch in early July 1945. He had studied medicine at
some of the most prestigious German medical faculties. Following military service in the First World War, he worked
at a nerve clinic in Bremen and later as a leading medical officer at the Thyssen works. After he passed the Prussian
examination for district medical officers in 1922, he worked at a social hygiene academy in Düsseldorf, from 1926 as a
medical officer in Mansfeld (West Prussia), and from 1930 as a senior civil servant and the head of a medical
department in Osnabrück. From February 1933 until April 1945 he ran the medical department of the Berlin Police and
a committee on forensic medicine. He also lectured at a state medical academy.  In contrast to many members of the
Central Health Administration (see the second half of the chapter), Redeker belonged to the generation of social
hygienists who had displayed much closer affinity towards biological models of society, and throughout his career had
taken an active role in securing the status and rights of the medical profession.
Another experienced health officer was Bruno Harms. He joined the Magistrat as Sauerbruch's successor in July 1946,
after spending a year at the Central Health Administration of the Soviet zone. Born in 1890, he had studied natural
sciences and medicine in Berlin. After military service in the First World War, he ran a social hygiene department at
the Berlin health office. Later, he worked as a medical officer and chief of the district health office of Berlin-
Tiergarten, until he was dismissed in 1933 because of his membership of the German Democratic Party (DDP). After
1933, he set up a private practice and worked at a hospital in Berlin-Moabit. From November 1941 until January 1945
he served in the Wehrmacht.  He knew Sauerbruch from his time as district medical officer and got to know him well
at the Charité in the early 1930s—so he explained as one of the main supporting witnesses at Sauerbruch's
denazification tribunal.
Georg Wundram was an older, experienced health officer. He was born in 1880 and had trained in veterinary medicine
at the veterinary academy in Berlin. Since 1924 he had occupied leading positions in the state meat inspection
service.  His career, like that of Redeker and the other Charité men mentioned earlier, had flourished in the 1930s.
From 1945 he worked at the Magistrat, and later also the Central Health Administration.  The last person to be
considered here is Karl-Wilhelm Clauberg. Born in 1893, he was professor of hygiene and bacteriology at the
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of hospitals, lastly in Berlin-Schlachtensee.  In 1945 Sauerbruch's department appointed him to set up bacteriological
laboratories and testing centres in each city district and to coordinate their work.
There was therefore an important overlap between the Magistrat's health work and the elite of the Charité. Initially,
meetings were even physically held in the surgical clinic of the Charité, until in mid-July 1945 the Health Department
received its own offices.  Sauerbruch's appointment facilitated the recruitment of doctors whose prior contact with
health administrative functions had been limited. A striking feature of this set was their continuous and stable careers,
which remained untouched by war and political upheaval, and in most cases continued to thrive after 1945. Soviet
priorities in these appointments did not lie in a strict denazification or weeding-out of ‘politically suspect’ individuals.
Well into the 1980s the Charité was known as a haven for former Nazis.  The communist surgeon Moritz Mebel
remembered that it was popularly referred to as a ‘fascist protective wall’ (a pun on the ‘antifascist protective wall’, the
official GDR description of the Berlin Wall). Another popular GDR saying was that the power of the workers and
peasants ended at the gates of the Charité.
Like their Charité colleagues, continuity also characterized the careers of most medical officers now at the Magistrat.
When meetings of district medical officers resumed, leading officials such as Franz Redeker and Georg Wundram had
been working in similar positions for decades, just like the majority of medical officers in their charge. There were a
handful of individuals with a different history, such as the socialist and resistance-group organizer Max Klesse, and the
Jewish mental health specialist Gustav Emanuel, both of whom had been sacked in 1933.  But the majority's careers
had remained steady and consistent throughout the rise and collapse of the Third Reich. A significant portion of these
medical officers were personally acquainted with the Charité grandees and with each other. Many of those present at
the meetings of medical officers after 1945 had for years been meeting the same people, often in the same rooms.
(ii) ‘The apolitical physician’
Questions of victimization and guilt were debated throughout Germany in a number of widely publicized exchanges
and dialogues, especially once claims that Germans had been the major victims of the Nazis began to grow in volume.
In spring and summer 1945, a series of open letters to Thomas Mann, still in exile in the United States (where he had
become an advocate of a ‘hard peace’), appealed for him to return and experience the extent of German suffering.
Germany had practically been one big concentration camp, wrote the writer Walter von Molo.  A few days later, the
novelist Frank Thieß published an open letter on the anguish of the ‘internal emigrants’ (innere Emigranten) in
Germany: those who had spent the years of Nazi rule in spiritual and intellectual isolation, but had not left the country.
He was concerned that neither the occupiers nor the émigrés distinguished between the many silent sufferers and the
few active Nazis. Not everyone was able to watch the German tragedy unfold ‘from the comfortable seats of foreign
countries’, he wrote.  Many others joined this chorus, arguing that the question of guilt for Nazi crimes was a moral
issue to be resolved by each person individually, and not one for outsiders to interfere in.
Doctors had more specific concerns about their future careers. The extensive collaboration of the medical profession
with the political institutions of the Third Reich has been documented and assessed in recent scholarship.  Nearly half
of all physicians joined the NSDAP.  The medical profession faced a huge moral accusation as investigations into
Nazi medicine began to gather momentum. By willingly serving the Nazi state, backing initiatives to cleanse German
society, and embracing racial science, observers noted, German doctors had disgraced themselves and betrayed their
professional ethics. The American-organized Doctors’ Trial at Nuremberg, which began in December 1946, opened
proceedings against twenty-three leading German physicians who had helped to formulate and execute the euthanasia
programme, or had conducted experiments on human beings without consent. The trial publicized many gruesome
details of medical research under Nazi rule.  Even before this trial, local denazification tribunals in all four
occupation zones were busily assessing individual careers and responsibilities.
In this context, doctors and medical officers across Germany tried to defend both their own and their profession's
credibility and legitimacy. At the denazification tribunals, in newspapers, periodicals, and other publications, the same
two arguments resurfaced: first, that ‘real’ medicine was outside the reach of politics and untouched by it; and second,
that the German national heritage in science and medicine was as relevant and important in 1945 as it had been
decades before. This two-pronged argument enabled those who had maintained successful careers to claim that the fact
of continuity was evidence of their disconnectedness from politics and the permanence of their moral standards, and
that they represented something bigger: the good of old, long-established German medical traditions, which long pre-
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Sauerbruch's own public defence is a good illustration. After an American initiative Sauerbruch was dismissed from
his office in the Magistrat on 12 October 1945 to face a denazification tribunal. He had never formally joined the
NSDAP or its affiliated organizations, but the Americans were suspicious of his financial prosperity and the award
(and his acceptance) of the title of privy councillor (Geheimrat) by Göring in 1934. But even though Sauerbruch was
temporarily removed from his administrative post, he was allowed to carry on as chief consultant at the Charité and in
other medical capacities. In January 1948, he was elected as head of the University of Berlin's Surgical Society.
It was thus not so much Sauerbruch's immediate livelihood that was at stake at the tribunal's hearings as his general
credibility and legitimacy. His defence focused on the argument that his non-involvement in political life was a
necessary, and inescapable, fact of his vocation. While he had obviously always been opposed to the Nazi regime, he
argued, it was of more significance that he had remained true to his medical calling, and this precluded any political
bias or action. The fact that his career had survived all economic, social, and political upheavals was evidence enough,
he insisted: he had continued to adhere to his medical mission during the First World War and the 1918 revolution,
during the Hitler regime and the Second World War. While the Nazis may have tried to befriend him, he had rejected
them as he would any political cause. He had carried out his medical duty for the dying Hindenburg, and in return for
this service (for which he had refused payment) he had received the apolitical and honorary title of privy councillor, as
a sign of Göring's gratitude. He had spoken to Hitler, Goebbels, and other leading Nazis, but only as a doctor and
therefore ‘strictly professionally’.  After several hearings the Magistrat denazification commission for doctors
eventually accepted this defence and, in July 1949, cleared him of any charges of wrongdoing. The commission
concluded that as a leading doctor the Nazis had naturally tried to recruit Sauerbruch, but he had never become
involved; he had always ‘held back’.
The reality of Sauerbruch's involvement was rather more murky. While Sauerbruch had indeed never joined the
NSDAP, he had repeatedly demonstrated his support. He had made a number of speeches in support of the Nazi
assumption of power in 1933 and later in favour of Nazi policy.  From 1937 he had been a member of the Reich
Research Council (Reichsforschungsrat), and as head of its medical section approved research projects involving
experiments on concentration camp inmates and in asylums. In 1942, as surgeon-general of the Wehrmacht,
Sauerbruch supported experiments with mustard gas on inmates of the concentration camp Natzweiler. As a member of
the scientific senate of the Military Medical Academy, he took part in discussions about experiments on prisoners.
With the evidence now available it seems undeniable that Sauerbruch endorsed many of the objectives of the Nazi
regime, and that he was rewarded for his loyalty. Not only was he made privy councillor, he was also decorated with
the National Prize at the NSDAP Party Congress in Nuremberg in 1937. In 1942 he was presented with the Knight's
Cross (Ritterkreuz zum Kriegsverdienstkreuz) by Karl Brandt, Hitler's personal physician and a lieutenant general of
the Waffen-SS, who was later convicted of war crimes at the Nuremberg medical trials.  He was one of the richest
doctors in Germany—during the Nazi years his annual income ranged between 200,000 and 300,000 Reichsmark —
and ‘dwelled in mansions, kept expensive horses, and sometimes showered his favourite assistants with miraculous
presents such as automobiles’.  He also wrote petitions for some of his former students and colleagues standing trial
in Nuremberg.
Sauerbruch's case shows that the denazification commissions’ criteria on Nazi activity (with their focus on the question
of party membership) often proved incapable of identifying and punishing those who had been involved. The case of
Sauerbruch's deputy, Franz Redeker, was very similar. Although the Americans dismissed him from his Magistrat
office in 1946 because of his suspected Nazi past, Redeker was soon cleared and appointed by the British to advise the
Hamburg health office. Later he worked in the health department of the Interior Ministry of the Federal Republic,
received an honorary professorship at the University of Bonn, before in 1953 becoming president of the Ministry of
Health (Bundesgesundheitsamt). Redeker was an influential force in the development of the West German health
service in the 1950s and 1960s. Like Sauerbruch and many of their colleagues, he was never forced to engage critically
with the medical profession's collaboration with Nazi programmes, or explain his own involvement.  Part of the
problem was that the occupiers were uncertain about how the criminality of medicine in the Third Reich was to be
defined and by which criteria it could be judged, as a result of which men like Sauerbruch escaped without
reprimand.  Disagreements between the Allies on how to proceed and whom to punish further undermined
denazification.
Sauerbruch's dismissal and tribunal rallied together many of his colleagues. The Berlin mayor hoped that he would at
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helped to appoint, complained that doctors like them were being misunderstood and maltreated. The chief internist at
the Gertrauden-Hospital wrote to Sauerbruch about his ‘unjust persecution’:
you have saved the true medical profession from the dangers of the past and transmitted it safely into our times.
You have ‘lived’ the tradition of true humanity and proved it possible to students and doctors alike. If you are
therefore being persecuted today—that is bitter indeed. One forgets that you have reached the highest standards in
your profession to the benefit not only of Germany but of the whole world, and you have done this at a time when
politicians only seemed keen on destruction. What would people have said if you had, like others, gone into exile:
that would have been desertion from our great country which was filled with suffering. By remaining here you
have helped us all, you have helped us believe in a better future during the terrible, hate-filled Nazi time.
Bruno Harms (a former colleague of Sauerbruch's at the Charité), and Käthe Hussels (medical officer for Berlin-
Zehlendorf and Sauerbruch's former student and Charité colleague) were among those who defended him at his
hearings along these lines.  This assessment of Sauerbruch has also survived in much more recent accounts. Jürgen
Thorwald's biography takes Sauerbruch at his word, when he observes that ‘the question [of political activism] was not
one which could be asked of Sauerbruch. His egocentricity, personal pride and sense of medical mission were coupled
with utter naivety in political matters. He simply found it hard to understand how he could ever have figured in
politics, ever exerted political influence.’
Later chapters examine the successes and failures of the denazification programmes in much more detail. What matters
here is that Sauerbruch's repeated protests against the charges of political activism and proximity to the Nazi regime
mirrored those put forward by doctors at denazification tribunals across the country. Their defences were not novel:
most had insisted for decades that the medical profession demanded a special and autonomous status. Nor was the
‘apolitical’ nature of doctors only asserted in post-war Germany. Nonetheless, these proclamations deserve scrutiny for
two reasons. First, the fact that a portion of the German medical profession interpreted their work very differently,
discussed in the section on the Central Health Administration, resulted in clashes and disagreements within the ranks of
doctors and medical officers. Second, much more was at stake for doctors than had been the case before or elsewhere.
Asserting the apolitical nature of their profession became a crucial means of saving individual reputations and careers.
The people presented here reacted by mobilizing an often long-held position, designed to rally the medical profession
for a joint defence which could limit and contain the damage of the Nazi period. Sauerbruch himself had long argued
for the apolitical nature of medicine, despite conspicuous contrary evidence. In September 1934 he published an open
letter to the German medical profession, defending a view of medicine as fundamentally independent, governed only
by medical ethics, and resulting in a godlike perspective and non-involvement in anything as base as politics.  But in
his post-war job at the Magistrat, this argument was now specifically directed towards the protection of himself and his
colleagues from accusations and blame.
Sauerbruch's position contributed to the power of his department and the formulation of fundamental tenets. In early
summer 1945 he argued successfully that medical officers and leading hospital positions must be appointed upon the
sole recommendation of his department, and only ratified later by the mayor, because no one else had the required
specialist knowledge. ‘Wrong appointments of medical officers can lead to a significant disruption of the general and
absolutely unified leadership of the health office’, he insisted.  This specialist medical knowledge, according to
Sauerbruch, included an appreciation of its fundamentally apolitical, ethical, and scientific orientation. Nazi party
membership, he insisted, had for many been a means to guarantee the continuation of their medical work; it was not a
signifier of political activism, especially not for doctors and medical officers, who by their nature were so averse to
politics. When in 1945 officials from one Berlin district proposed not just to remove leading Nazi doctors from their
positions but also to sack the Red Cross nurses who had joined the party, Sauerbruch's protest managed to prevent this.
This procedure would be unsatisfactory for the maintenance of the population's health, he argued, and ‘besides, it was
not humanly loyal to come to such conclusions on the more or less forced and rash act of joining the party, particularly
by those still young’,  Similarly, when Robert Rössle argued that the practice of sacking all former NSDAP members
from the medical faculty of the University of Berlin had to be prevented, Sauerbruch agreed. Among doctors a
distinction needed to be drawn, he argued, between the handful of Nazis who had committed crimes and the majority
of ‘harmless party members’.
Sauerbruch was an influential promoter of the ‘apolitical doctor’ who simply followed his calling, and deserved neither
punishment nor regulation. Soon, similar declarations could be heard everywhere. Once licences were granted and
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greetings, obituaries, and biographical notes on past German medical heroes, authors combined the portrayal of a
depoliticized medicine with an insistence on its autonomy. As J. Kottmaier wrote in the July 1947 issue of the
Medizinische Rundschau: ‘There is no other practical science which is less political than that of medicine’. He went
on:
Nothing proves more clearly our loyalty to the apolitical ideal of medical care than our unfailing devotion to the
Sisyphus work of caring for the wounded and sick during war, which lies completely above party politics. The
doctor always only wished to serve. He held his profession sacred and uncontaminated from political dealings—
so much so, that all the world's politicians used and abused him and his selfless services as a matter of fact. And
eventually we had to witness that type of politicised doctor who applied his knowledge and services to the
planned destruction of human life. We were used politically, without being asked, and in this way some of us were
seduced into political crimes.
To guard against interference from this ‘political type’, doctors had to close ranks and fight for their profession's
independence and autonomy.
A later issue of the same journal reprinted the resolution of the West German professional Council of Doctors on the
Nuremberg medical trials. It said the trials had illustrated what happened when institutions and bureaucracies were
allowed to impinge on and interfere with medicine. In an explicit reference to the occupation, the resolution stated that
the dangers were not over: ‘Yesterday it was the National Socialist party and the Wehrmacht who intervened in,
corrupted or destroyed the freedom of medical work, and tomorrow it can be foreign powers and socialist
bureaucracy.’ The solution would be to guarantee the medical profession absolute sovereignty and freedom from
political interference:
The basic demand remains—that in the work of providing active help for our fellow human beings, the self-
reliance and self-responsibility of the doctor must remain untouched and that society has to do everything possible
to guarantee the doctor's sovereignty. No doctor should ever be given orders, instructions or commands, and he
should only follow the demands of his science and his professional ethics.
Although more careful and cautious, Alexander Mitscherlich and Fred Mielke came to similar conclusions about the
importance of medical autonomy in their report on the Nuremberg medical trials. Mitscherlich was appointed to head
the German Medical Commission to the American Military Tribunal No. 1 in Nuremberg, and with Mielke he
published a report, later expanded to accompany a documentary collection on what they had heard. They noted that
[p]hysicians treating patients under a national health insurance are obliged to communicate their diagnosis to the
government officials there employed. Thus the original relationship of trust between the doctor and patient is
being more and more overshadowed by non-medical considerations. And even today, with the brutal, government-
inspired system of extirpation and eugenics ended, the physician must keep on fighting for that freedom of his
profession to which the fulfilment of his fundamental duties is forever joined. For it seems to be of small moment
for the future whether the imposed code of contempt for the dignity of man issues from bureaucratic indifference
or ideological aggression.
Most of these commentaries focused on general medical practice and the independence of private physicians and
medical researchers. But repeated references to bureaucratic influence, and Mitscherlich's concerns about insurance
doctors, show that autonomy was also seen as crucial to medical officers and state-employed doctors. Given their
proximity to the state, they were, in fact, identified as needing special protection from political interference.
In some features, Mitscherlich's argument differed from that of other commentators. He pointed to the dangers of a
mechanistic view of disease and medical care, and argued that one of the central problems underlying Nazi medical
abuses was that doctors had adopted overtly utilitarian aims. An ethically (rather than scientifically) driven method had
to rescue medical practice and restore the doctor–patient relationship. It was not just a handful of doctors standing trial
at Nuremberg, he insisted, but the ‘dubious ethics of unbridled medical experimentation’ much more generally.
Despite such differences, Mitscherlich and other German observers agreed on one thing: the betrayal of the physicians’
ethic had been caused by the intrusion of the state into the medical profession, and it was essential that its freedom was
guarded and protected from further interference. The diagnosis that an overpowering and manipulative state
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highlight the similarities between what they saw as the totalitarian states of Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union. In
fact, Kottmaier's abhorrence of the ‘political type’ and his reference to ‘socialist bureaucracy’ both point to another
element in this analysis—that Nazi doctors and health officers were in essence of the same type as communist or
socialist doctors and medical officers: both apparently subordinated medical work to their political agendas, threatened
and harmed the medical profession's unity and independence, and both had to be prevented from exerting any future
influence.
Apart from advocating a ‘return’ to a depoliticized, rescientized, and independent medicine, a second rallying point in
these proclamations concerned the German national medical heritage. Commentators suggested, at times explicitly,
that intruding foreign powers threatened a noble German heritage, especially when they attempted to make judgements
about Germans’ past crimes and misdemeanours. The people presented here regularly reminded both their German and
Allied colleagues of the importance of their training, their past work experience, and their way of doing things. Many
complained about foreign interference, particularly that by Soviet officers. In November 1946, Robert Rössle wrote in
irritation: ‘There are constant Russian visitors with questions and suggestions. As though we are academic novices!
Again, we are being put “into line”, “Attention! Eyes Eastwards!” ’  Leading German officials protested about Soviet
complaints that they lacked initiative in the fight against epidemics. To them, the expertise and resourcefulness of
German doctors and officials were beyond reproach. ‘The problem was not that doctors were lacking knowledge or
understanding,’ they insisted, ‘but that organisational issues had not been solved (for example, the refusal to grant
petrol, the stealing of our cars and bicycles, and so on). And incidentally, the local Russian commanders were only
rarely sticking to the orders they had received from the Soviet administration.’
Others were more optimistic about being able to reassert the German heritage. Franz Redeker observed that the Soviet
authorities had more or less given them a free hand in the reorganization of the health service. At a meeting of the
Berlin district medical officers in July 1945, he reminded those present that in matters of public health organization
and health insurance the German experience was unique and should be replicated and redeveloped. He ‘explained that
the idea of a health insurance is alien to the Russian state and is not known there. The care for the sick and their
provision with medicine and treatment in hospitals are the responsibility of the state. On the other side we have the
way the Americans handle it: “Everyone on his own”. Germany has previously stood in between. The Red Army has
now let us decide how to solve the problem. Hence we can once more revive the idea of a health insurance.’
These arguments on the importance of an autonomous medical profession were different in tone from those on the
freedom of science and medicine from state control advanced elsewhere. In Britain and the United States,
internationalism was asserted as a key ingredient of scientific freedom.  Henry Dale, president of the Royal Society,
addressed an anniversary meeting in November 1945 in just these terms. The Royal Society had as its primary duty,
Dale argued, to ensure that science was conducted within ‘the framework of international collaboration which had been
constructed between the wars’. He continued, ‘[i]f we are to achieve anything really to meet that need [of science
today], we must somehow get rid of barriers which hinder the scientists of different countries from meeting simply as
scientists, for the frank and informal interchange and friendly criticism of each others’ observations and ideas, in
complete freedom from any national inhibitions or restrictions.’
At the same time as Dale was lecturing on the virtues of scientific internationalism, in Germany this internationalist
rhetoric still lay in its infancy. Here, nationalism coloured much of the discussion. Those who argued for an apolitical,
‘free’, and scientific medicine often also claimed past German manifestations, accomplishments, and developments as
this ideal's best realization. The resulting contradiction between a resentment of state control and a celebration of
German state institutions remained unresolved, even unidentified. In the discussions in the German medical journals,
the statement that some form of international cooperation was necessary, was invariably followed by an insistence that
past German findings and traditions were of special value and deserved special protection. Even in the current ‘dark
times’, as a January 1947 editorial put it, two centuries of German culture and traditions testified to the special
qualities of German knowledge and scholarship, and were ‘rays of light’ for the present. It went on:
Just as the German people have to build new homes and houses out of the rubble and ruins of their old buildings
by making use of the old stones that have survived the fires, we as free German doctors also want to gather the
old, tried and tested stones of our science, so that they can be cleansed, and together with new materials combined
in a harmonious international construction of the most noble, honourable and compassionate humanity which
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Although neither science nor its humane orientation knew national boundaries, specifically German building blocks
were to be provided for its reconstruction. In similar language, the biochemist Emil Abderhalden argued a few months
later that Germany had to be recognized as an important member of the new international community and deserved
equal rights, particularly because of its many past contributions in medicine and science. ‘The German doctor’,
Abderhalden wrote, ‘looks with pride at the valuable contributions of German researchers. They remain unforgettable.
The German people should and must be inspired by them and recover through them. They can be assured that these
cultural and scientific contributions will have a favourable effect and will in the near future be generally accepted
again.’
This chorus by doctors and writers on the value and permanence of ‘good’ German medical traditions served specific
purposes in the present: to absolve the profession from the accusation of collaboration with the Nazis and any crude
political involvement. The mental gymnastics they performed were in some ways very successful, as we will see in
later chapters. By blaming troubles on the intrusion of politics into medicine they removed themselves from the scene
of the crime. By maintaining that Nazi medicine had subordinated medical and scientific demands to political ends,
that it had made medicine a tool for politicians, they found supporting evidence for their argument on the profession's
need for independence.  By decrying their left-wing medical colleagues as politically corruptible and equating their
agendas with those of the Nazis, they cast themselves in a favourable light and, knowingly or not, found common
ground with some of their occupiers. They were not, of course, ‘non-political’, but remarkably adept at protecting their
status while adapting to new regimes and political agendas—skills they had already demonstrated in the 1930s. Their
allusions to the golden fruits of old German traditions, intellectual strength, and cultural achievements signalled to the
occupiers not to meddle, and not to impose new orders or new ways of doing things.
(iii) Rudolf Virchow (version 1)
Another expression of this self-awareness of past German achievements can be found in the many newly published, or
reprinted and amended, biographies and biographical essays on famous doctors and scientists. They identified older
and positive German traditions and called for their application in the present. In writing about their famous teachers or
colleagues, doctors and medical scientists celebrated German idols as the founding fathers or forebears of current good
medical practice, and presented themselves as evidence of this heritage's survival. These heroes now reminded them
that, after all, not everything about German history was to be regretted. Although these figures often had significant
international reputations, and in many cases had worked abroad for a long time and with foreign collaborators, in these
accounts their German ancestry was seen as most crucial.
The famous pathologist Rudolf Virchow became a favourite icon of the post-war years. A wealth of articles and
biographies celebrated his revolutionary scientific findings, his healthy patriotism, his apolitical dedication to pure
medicine, his humane medical practice, his civic-mindedness, his battle against outmoded German structures and
institutions, his application of scientific principles to public health—in short, his status as a German role model.  By
1953, his image had been built: in a speech commemorating the fiftieth anniversary of Virchow's death, Curt Froboese,
director of the pathological institute at Berlin-Spandau, declared that the medical profession must once again learn to
follow the example of ‘the great German and truly democratic man of science!’  Virchow was ‘our greatest
pathologist’, Froboese proclaimed. He had contributed the ground-breaking conception of cellular pathology and was
an authority in many other medical fields, but above all came Virchow's contributions to practical and ‘pure’
medicine.  Virchow's contemporaries from across the world had recognized his unique intellectual force, and many
thought that he was at least as influential on medical practice as Hippocrates.
But more recently, Froboese went on, Virchow's name had been tarred by negative propaganda. Unfortunately ‘[t]oday
and after the recent decades’ upheavals … still not all doctors are defending the true and just position, which Virchow's
impeccable character, his physically and intellectually fearless nature and his extensive use of self-criticism,
deserves.’  The whole German medical profession must celebrate Virchow as their true scientific and ethical role
model and father, Froboese insisted. The young generation of doctors, particularly, had to learn to appreciate his
scientific importance, his personal integrity, and true patriotism. ‘May the young ones be led to Virchow!’, Froboese
proclaimed, ‘May others, who over the course of the years have distanced themselves from Virchow (deliberately or
not) be led back to him! May we all resolve to leave this extraordinary man out of the play of wild passions and instead
bestow on him the honour and justice he deserves as a seeker of truth!’
In these accounts Virchow's participation in the revolution in 1848 in Berlin was presented, if at all, as a very marginal
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concluded that ‘Virchow's participation at the short-lived revolution was relatively insignificant … And even when he
was involved in his politics, Virchow never neglected his pathological courses for a single day.’  Unger was a press
officer for the Nazi Doctors’ League and active in the circle of doctors around Hitler who urged him to adopt a
euthanasia programme. Before this latest work on Virchow, in the 1930s Unger had published a novel which promoted
euthanasia, as well as popular accounts of Robert Koch's and Emil von Behring's achievements.  Now, in the post-
war years, Unger's and Froboese's analyses stood in great contrast to the assessments of Virchow which are presented
in the second half of this chapter ((iii) Rudolf Virchow (version 2), and which focused almost exclusively on Virchow's
revolutionary engagement. Froboese's mention of various recent attempts at blackening Virchow's name, of the ‘play
of wild passions’, and that not all German doctors appreciated Virchow in the right manner should be understood as
references not just to leading Nazis’ condemnation of Virchow but also to communist assessments of him as one of the
important revolutionaries of 1848.
Along with Virchow, figures such as Robert Koch, Emil von Behring, and Paul Ehrlich were turned into public
favourites and portrayed in a similar celebratory light.  Behring had for some time featured as an icon in National
Socialist literature, and Hellmuth Unger and the bacteriologist Heinrich Zeiss had celebrated him in a series of
publications in the 1930s. But now, as positive German national traditions were to be rescued, the Jewish doctor
Ehrlich was fitted onto this canvas. Ehrlich's former secretary Martha Marquardt republished her memoirs of Ehrlich
with a new preface and postscript, and proclaimed:
only the shining examples of great men can save us from discouragement and faintheartedness in the face of
inhuman atrocities and destruction which have surrounded us—only the examples of a man like Ehrlich, a man
who dedicated and sacrificed his whole life to the welfare and healing of mankind, never failing in his idealism,
his optimism and his faith … To Ehrlich nothing on earth mattered except scientific research aimed at overcoming
suffering and disease, and increasing the happiness of mankind.
A series of 1947 advertising flyers by the chemical concern Hoechst made use of these icons (see Fig. 4.1). Much of
this output was not just popular, but also had important pedagogic functions: through biographies of German idols and
republished textbooks by the Charité grandees, and their lectures at the universities, there was an opportunity for the
younger generation, who had not actually experienced pre-1933 German medicine, to take on the mantle for
themselves.
The Central Health Administration of the Soviet Zone (ZVG)
(i) Origins and Composition
In offices not far from the Magistrat, continuities of a very different kind were advanced by the Central Health
Administration (Zentralverwaltung für das Gesundheitswesen, ZVG). This organization had its roots in the Soviet
Order No. 17 of 27 July 1945, which created a number of ‘central administrations’ for different functions. In the other
zones administrations were established only at the local and provincial level, but from the beginning the Soviet
authorities focused on centralized administrations, or quasi-ministries, charged with a range of functions for the whole
of the Soviet zone.  Demands for a central health ministry had been voiced regularly throughout the 1920s and 1930s,
and formed a central feature of many German émigrés’ plans for the future public health service.  Its creation in the
Soviet zone meant that for the first time in Germany there was to be an institution responsible for the whole of the
public health and medical services.
On 24 August 1945 the ZVG began its work under two social democrats, Paul Konitzer and Ignatz Zadek, supervised
by the Health Department of SMAG.  It was directly responsible for the running of the health service in the Soviet
zone, a task which involved issuing directives and instructions to German doctors on how to interpret and implement
the Soviet orders; coordinating the public health work of Land and provincial departments; appointing medical officers
and evening out surpluses and shortages of personnel by relocating officials and doctors; collecting and compiling
medical statistics; and long-term planning work.  On 15 September 1945 Soviet officials approved the ZVG's initial
appointments as well as a draft of its statute which was to guide the future work of the zone's health service.
For the first few years after its establishment the ZVG had around 170 staff. It was divided into three administrative
and approximately ten specialist departments (see Tables 4.1–4.3). It was headed by a president, and by December
1945 three vice-presidents had also been appointed, each overseeing three or four departments. In contrast to the
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had been interrupted by the Nazi rise to power in January 1933 (through loss of positions, emigration, imprisonment,
or involuntary periods spent in other work) made up a significant portion of senior posts.
Who were the people working at the ZVG? Much of post-war life in Germany, and German contacts with Allied
officials, revolved around political parties, so they form a useful way of identifying and demarcating different groups
and networks. It was a primary aim of the occupation, repeatedly asserted at the wartime conferences, to cleanse
Germany of all Nazi influences, and as a result German political organizations were officially dissolved by the end of
the war. But just over a month into the occupation, the Soviets had encouraged the re-formation of German political
parties—some time before their French, British, and American counterparts. Soviet Order No. 2 of 10 June agreed to
the establishment of ‘antifascist parties and trade unions’ in the territory of Berlin and the Soviet zone.  The
Communist Party (KPD) reconstituted itself on the following day, the Social Democrats (SPD) a few days later, and
over the next few weeks the Christian Democrats (CDU) and Liberal Party (LPD) followed.
Many activists had worked within their party circles for decades, and it is possible to distinguish between three roughly
drawn groups of people working at the ZVG. Social democrats were one group, and in the immediate post-war period
were the majority among executive officials. Many had been involved in municipal public health in the 1920s and
1930s. The communists were another group, and their numbers increased from late 1945 onwards due to the staggered
return of émigrés to the Soviet zone. Most of them had also worked in the German public health service before 1933.
Although well represented in the ZVG, both KPD and SPD members were a small minority among doctors and health
officers in the Soviet zone overall.  A third group consisted of a number of people who did not belong to any
political party. Maxim Zetkin described some of them as ‘politically blank slates’,  while others had long military-
medical careers or some involvement in Nazi medicine behind them. Some insisted on their aloofness from politics,
and a number of them were also active in the Magistrat Health Department.
This third cluster was not a coherent group but rather an assembly of a range of backgrounds and mindsets. The SPD
and KPD members, by contrast, shared similar biographies, and many were personally acquainted with each other.
Most came from bourgeois or petty-bourgeois backgrounds; those who were Jewish came from assimilated families.
The older generation among them, those born in the mid-1880s and 1890s, made up the majority of health officers.
Having grown up in Wilhelmine Germany they were contemporaries of the leading officers among the occupiers.
Most of them had fought in the German army in the First World War.  A younger generation, those born in the first
decade of the twentieth century, was also well represented.  They had come of age during the crises of the aftermath
of the First World War and the early years of the Weimar Republic. Many were later active on various Second World
War fronts, but unlike their Magistrat colleagues few of them fought in the Wehrmacht.  A third generation, those
born after 1910 and who qualified under the Nazis, made up only a handful of people in the ZVG.
The majority of the SPD and KPD groups had studied medicine at major German universities, and a significant portion
ended up in Berlin for their final semesters or practical year of clinical training. Most then worked for the municipal
health system, particularly in municipal hospitals or as district medical officers. Felix Boenheim, for example, had
spent a short period at the Moabit Hospital in Berlin before being drafted into the army. After the end of the First
World War he worked at the municipal hospitals in Rostock, Nuremberg, and Stuttgart, before continuing his career at
the Hufeland Hospital in Berlin.  Similarly, Erwin Marcusson had been a junior doctor at the municipal hospital in
Berlin-Neukölln, after having worked as a school medical officer in Altenburg.  Ignatz Zadek, whose father was a
well-known SPD social hygienist, had until 1933 also worked at the municipal hospital in Neukölln.  Maxim Zetkin
had worked at the municipal hospital in Augsburg before the First World War, and from 1918 until his move to
Moscow in 1920 at the municipal hospital in Berlin-Schöneberg.
Alfred Beyer, one of the oldest members of the ZVG, had since 1919 worked at the medical departments of the
Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of Welfare.  Many others had been employed as doctors by local or
municipal authorities. Anneliese Hamann was a welfare service doctor in Berlin from 1924 to 1933. From 1926 until
1934, Max Klesse was both a school and district medical officer.  After a period at the Charité and at an infant clinic
in Berlin-Halensee, Katharina Klingelhöfer worked as a school medical officer in Berlin until 1945.  Paul Konitzer
entered the public health service in 1921, and worked as an SPD city councillor and senior medical officer in
Magdeburg.  Hermann Redetzky worked as a junior doctor in a proletarian district of Berlin, and in 1930 joined the
city health office.  Walter Friedeberger was a superintendent of the insured health centres (Ambulatorien) in Berlin,
while Helmut Lehmann was involved in running the Berlin insurance funds.  The case of Friedrich Wolf, the





















21-4-2020 ‘Now, back to our Virchow’: German Medical and Political Traditions in Post-war Berlin - The Perils of Peace - NCBI Bookshelf
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK293859/?report=printable 13/38
of the shared features of these biographies. He had been a medical officer in Remscheid, and later worked as a doctor
for an insurance fund in Stuttgart. Here he became active in the opening of maternity and antenatal clinics. In his 1929
pro-legalized abortion drama Cyankali, he painted a grim picture of working-class living conditions, exacerbated by
the lack of education and contraception and the existing moralistic abortion legislation. He was arrested in 1931 for
carrying out illegal abortions.
As we have seen, some of their non-political colleagues had also worked in the public health service.  But in other
respects they differed from the political groups. A shared feature of KPD and SPD health officials was that their
medical careers had been intertwined with their political work. Many had become involved in party politics in the
years after the First World War. Some of the KPD set, in particular, had been involved in the short-lived workers’ and
soldiers’ councils and had supported the Bavarian Socialist Republic of 1918. Felix Boenheim, just after he was
expelled from the army for insulting the War Ministry (and narrowly missed a court martial), began to receive the
Political Letters of the Spartacus group. In 1918, he joined the workers’ and soldiers’ council in Stuttgart, participated
in the abortive Munich Republic, and was, briefly, minister for cultural affairs in the Munich cabinet. After fleeing
Munich in the aftermath of the Republic, he became involved with the KPD.  After his military service Erwin
Marcusson participated in the Spartacist uprising in Berlin and joined a workers’ and soldiers’ council.  Friedrich
Wolf joined both the Independent Social Democrats (USPD) and the workers’ and soldiers’ council in Saxony in April
1918. Later, while working as a medical officer, he moved on to the KPD.
The KPD and SPD members had been influenced by the changes to the political landscape that occurred in post-First
World War Germany, particularly the increasing divisions within the SPD (since 1912 the largest party in the
Reichstag ). By April 1917, disagreements triggered partly by the fact that the party majority had supported the
government's request for funds at the outset of war, led a group of left-wingers directed by Hugo Haase to form the
USPD. Haase was a famous lawyer who had defended leading personalities of the Left in a series of high-profile cases.
He was also Felix Boenheim's uncle.  Further to the left, a small group of militant revolutionaries had formed around
Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht and constituted themselves into the Spartacus League, from the remnants of
which the KPD was created.
Both the SPD and KPD members of the ZVG received their formative political education in this political context.
Maxim Zetkin and Helmut Lehmann, the oldest members of the ZVG, had already joined the SPD at the beginning of
the century. Zetkin was also involved in post-First World War developments. As a teenager and junior doctor he carried
out secretarial work for his mother, Clara Zetkin (who played a leading role in the Spartacus circle and the founding of
the KPD), and had accompanied her on trips and congresses abroad.  In 1917 he left the SPD to join the USPD, and
two years later the newly founded KPD. The younger health officers, particularly those without family links to political
parties, had in many cases come into the orbit of political groupings in the early years of the Weimar Republic, while at
university.  Surrounded by post-war hunger and dire economic conditions they criticized the detachment of their
parents, and began to focus on the link between disease and social conditions, and the role of health policy in social
reforms. Their politicized view of not just disease but the doctor's tasks was at odds with the majority of the medical
profession in Germany. Even after the First World War, when it became clear that social democracy was going to be an
even stronger force in German life, it found little support among members of the profession.
Most of these politically active health officers in the ZVG had been active in political-medical organizations. The
communists had been involved in groups such as the Proletarian Health Service, the Working Group of Communist
Doctors, and International Workers’ Aid. Some of the communist doctors had in 1921 submitted, via the Communist
Party, motions on health policy to the Prussian State Parliament and the Reichstag. Here, and in other programmes,
they demanded the unification of the health and welfare services under a central ministry, and the financing of the
system from public funds. Other priorities were the reform of tuberculosis hospitals, new treatment centres for venereal
diseases, maternity clinics, and the revision of abortion legislation. Many travelled to the USSR in the 1920s and wrote
glowing reviews on the successes of the newly nationalized Soviet health system. Consequently, some work on health
policy also took place in a series of German–Soviet friendship organizations.
Several of the social democrats had been involved in the Social Democratic Doctors’ Union, which Ignatz Zadek's
father had co-founded in December 1913.  In 1919 this was renamed the Association of Socialist Doctors; in 1923
members of the right wing of the SPD left to form a separate group, triggered by fights over the doctors’ strikes and
the workings of the insured health centres in Berlin. The association subsequently contained both social democrats and
communists and became the biggest grouping of socialist doctors, a number of whom were present in the ZVG in
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operated in Berlin. Some of the association's health policy demands had included campaigns for birth control, the
abolition of paragraph 218 (which prohibited abortion), the creation of a central health ministry, the creation of chairs
in social hygiene at the major universities, and its compulsory inclusion in the medical syllabus. The association also
became one of the most vocal opponents of Nazi racial hygiene. Their programme showed that differences existed
between factions within the KPD and SPD, particularly on issues such as the desirability of bringing public health
under municipal (rather than state) control, and the role of eugenically oriented measures in health reform.  Factions
of both parties sometimes found substantial common ground.
Although SPD and KPD members had successfully worked together, both party sets had also been moulded by the
irreconcilable split between the far Left and the majority of the SPD. Years of fierce opposition had escalated during
the KPD campaign which branded the SPD ‘social fascists’ and had as their main aim its destruction. This tactic,
begun in 1928, only ended after the Nazis had taken power and Stalin changed to a popular front strategy, but their
relationship barely improved after the abrupt 1935 Comintern emphasis on building united antifascist fronts. In 1945,
when both parties had to negotiate the pitfalls of Soviet occupation, and when members now joined the same
institutions, this was important baggage.
Set against this antagonism was the shared disruption of their careers after 1933 and the persecution of those involved
in socialist health politics, many of whom were also Jewish. Almost all of the politically active members of the ZVG
lost their positions after 1933. Some moved on to private medical practice: Alfred Beyer was sacked from the Ministry
of the Interior in February 1933 because of his SPD membership, and set up his own practice after 1939. Anneliese
Hamann was dismissed in 1933 for communist activities, and from 1934 worked in her own practice. Max Klesse, too,
opened a practice after being sacked in 1934. Klingelhöfer was dismissed for six months in 1933, but then re-employed
as school medical officer. Paul Konitzer, who was sacked in 1933 ‘for political reasons’, set up a practice in Dresden
and was drafted into the Wehrmacht in 1939.  Zadek established himself as a specialist for internal diseases after
being dismissed in 1933.  Redetzky resigned from his Berlin office in July 1933, and became a specialist in internal
diseases.
Some were involved in underground work, and some were imprisoned: Fritz Leo was arrested by the Gestapo in 1935,
and then spent two years in prison in Zwickau and eight years in four different concentration camps. Helmut Lehmann
was sacked and arrested in March 1933, and once again in 1935 as head of a resistance group of SPD members and
trade union officials in Berlin. Following the July 1944 plot he was arrested again and sent to Tegel prison, from where
he was liberated in April 1945.  Klesse was involved in the North Berlin-based resistance group Mannhart.
Schölmerich, too, apparently worked illegally for the KPD after a short period in Swiss exile, and as part of this work
infiltrated the NSDAP.
Some emigrated and only returned to Germany after 1945. Zetkin had already moved to Moscow in 1920. Baer left in
1935, and went first to Spain, then to China and Burma. Coutelle emigrated to Moscow in 1934, and later also went on
to Spain and Burma. Friedeberger emigrated to France in 1935 after he was dismissed and briefly arrested in 1933.
Following two years of internment in Morocco, he then emigrated to the United States in 1941. In 1934, Marcusson
emigrated to Switzerland after he had been arrested in April 1933, and then moved on to Moscow in February 1936.
Neumann also emigrated to Switzerland, then to France in 1933, later to Mexico. Friedrich Wolf, who was arrested
over the abortion scandal in 1931, travelled to Moscow following his release, working for an Agitprop theatre group of
the KPD.  After years of touring many countries in 1938 he was interned in France and escaped to Moscow in 1941.
Kurt Winter emigrated to Switzerland in 1935, later to Spain and Sweden. In exile, members of the future ZVG were
active in the Free Germany groups discussed in Chapter 3.
A significant portion of the communist set also joined the International Brigades during the Spanish Civil War. Rudolf
Neumann was one of the first foreign volunteers to arrive in Spain, and some have credited him with organizing and
directing the International Brigades’ medical service. Rolf Becker arrived in Spain in 1936, and worked as chief
medical officer of the Eleventh Brigade until 1938. Maxim Zetkin also arrived in 1936, when he became an advisory
surgeon to the Republican Army. Baer, Coutelle, and Winter all arrived in Spain in 1937 and fought until the end in
1939. Friedrich Wolf left Moscow for Spain in 1938, and after the disbandment of the International Brigades was
interned in France.
The social democrats and particularly the communist doctors could perhaps be described as ‘medical mercenaries’ or
‘missionaries’. They all had worked on a succession of political projects that needed doctors: in city slums during the
interwar economic crisis, in émigré groups, in the International Brigades in Spain, at the Sino-Japanese war front, or in
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one who made this link explicitly in retrospect. She returned from British exile to her native Vienna, before she joined
her husband Heinz Schmidt in Berlin in August 1946 and began work for the ZVG. She remembered that life in the
Soviet zone was far from easy, with small rations, lack of heating, and poor health conditions, ‘but the force of our
political conviction and our feeling regarding the responsibilities of communists, as well the stamina, toughness and
resourcefulness which us few survivors had learnt during illegality and war, all gave us the strength to take on party
missions and to fulfil them’.
In sum, the SPD and KPD sets in the ZVG overlapped biographically in a series of subsets and intersecting circles,
which bound them together and set them apart from their other colleagues. Some had met as Berlin medical officers or
at the municipal hospitals; others had worked together in the Association of Socialist Doctors, the exile groups, or the
International Brigades. And even those who had not actually met in person before 1945 could easily place and assess
each other on the basis of shared patterns. Moritz Mebel was immediately able to identify Kurt Winter as a ‘comrade in
the struggle’ when they eventually met at the Charité in the late 1950s.
(ii) The political physician
These biographical patterns are important for a number of reasons. First, the gathering of socialist doctors and ‘medical
missionaries’ made the ZVG qualitatively different from other institutions in the German health service; there was
nothing like it anywhere else. Elsewhere, individual communists were appointed to public health administrative posts,
but they were isolated and often had difficult relationships with the occupiers.  In the ZVG, politically active doctors
made up the majority, and communists occupied some of the key administrative positions: those in charge of
appointments, personnel policy, and organization.  Second, the composition of the ZVG (the SPD and KPD factions
and the third group) resulted in obvious clashes, not just between the two party sets but also between them and their
non-political colleagues.
The old animosities between the KPD and SPD sets survived, after April 1946, when the Socialist Unity Party (SED)
was created in the Soviet zone by the enforced merger of both parties. The way in which they presented themselves at
meetings and during discussions with other health officers in the immediate post-war years demonstrates the survival
of their party identities. At a meeting of health officers from the Soviet zone, Lehmann introduced himself with the
words ‘I am speaking here as a representative of the social democrats’.  At similar meetings, Zetkin at times
defended the ‘socialists’ position’.
Tensions and open disagreements between SPD and KPD people ranged from contrary assessments of the political
situation to frustrations about personnel politics. The social democrat Max Klesse, a vociferous letter writer, was often
critical of communist (and Soviet) strategies. In a letter to Zetkin, he criticized the KPD's proclamations on the
extensive German support of the Hitler regime and the lack of any real resistance. As somebody who had spent all
twelve years of Nazi rule inside Germany, he wrote, he had experienced how ‘even old communists and socialists,
trembling with anxiety, had taken our flyers to the Gestapo or refused to hide typewriters or copy machines even for
one day, or who refused to house Jews for a single night’. And he knew that ‘the nerves of the people had already been
shattered by the bombing campaigns, they had no strength left to actively resist or fight an illegal battle against Hitler
and as a result they gave in to the Nazi terror without resistance!’ The SED may have realized this by now, he wrote,
but to Marxists, who were able to distinguish between the ruling and the ruled, this misunderstanding of the guilt
question should not have arisen in the first place.
Apart from general disagreements, personnel policy was an issue that frustrated the social democrats, not least because
they suspected favourable treatment of their KPD colleagues by the Soviet forces. The reality was more complicated.
As Naimark has shown, ‘Soviet commandants carefully nurtured the other parties and involved them in local
government. They aided the SPD, in particular, more scrupulously than the KPD would have liked, creating the
impression among some social-democratic leaders that the Soviets actually preferred working with SPD
politicians.’  Moreover, in the ZVG the situation was skewed by the fact that Zetkin was not just a communist, but
one of those few Germans with Soviet citizenship, who blurred the line between Soviets and Germans in charge.
The case of Paul Konitzer was also not typical for the treatment of social democrats. As first president of the ZVG, the
Soviets had approved Konitzer's appointment, and had listened to and respected him,  until he was arrested in
February 1947 and apparently hanged himself in prison in April 1947, while awaiting his trial. What had happened?
Following his career as public health activist and social hygienist and his dismissal in 1933, Konitzer had been drafted
into the Wehrmacht in 1939. From 1941 he worked as a chief staff surgeon in Wehrkreis IV (Dresden, Saxony) and
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1945. In 1946 the Soviet authorities discovered the bodies of tens of thousands of Russian POWs, who had perished as
a result of typhus and other epidemics which were rampant in the camp. An investigative commission reported over
35,000 bodies in mass graves, and the Soviet authorities held Konitzer responsible.  The Soviets said that the deaths
of their own citizens was not an issue on which a compromise could be made, even if in this case it concerned a
German political ally.
Konitzer's fate stands out. Social democrats also directed other central administrations, and none died in such
ambiguous circumstances. A number of social democratic doctors later left the Soviet zone and resumed their careers
in the West, while others continued to thrive and prosper in the Soviet zone/GDR. Alfred Beyer, for example, had a
dazzling career as one of East Germany's most celebrated social hygienists. However, tensions between SPD and KPD
members were far from negligible in the ZVG's personnel politics. That Konitzer, before his death, was right at the
heart of it, is revealed in a letter by Zetkin to the SED's central committee on his worries about Konitzer's reliability.
Schölmerich had reported on Konitzer's openly anti-Soviet views, Zetkin wrote. Konitzer had apparently complained
that ‘he could not agree with Russian personnel policy, nor Russian policy generally. A main factor was that they were
badly advised, especially by people like comrade Ulbricht. This situation had to end, this much had been agreed in his
close circle.’ Zetkin suspected sabotage when Konitzer suddenly changed his mind on issues that had already been
agreed, and had an ‘of course unproven—suspicion that K. wanted to demonstrate that the personnel policy of the
Soviet Military Administration will lead to our organisation's standstill’. It was also suspicious, Zetkin wrote, that
Klingelhöfer and her husband, both of whom were active social democrats, were apparently meeting with Konitzer in
private.  Zetkin wanted to inform the Soviet authorities that in spite of pro-Soviet statements, Konitzer could not be
seen as reliable: ‘K.'s heart is not with us’. He asked the central committee to find a party comrade who could, should
it become necessary, take over, although he noted that Konitzer probably had to stay for now for reasons of political
expediency.  That letter was written in November 1946. In early January 1947, Zetkin was speculating in a note to
Klesse about an imminent change in the ZVG's leadership. On 18 February 1947 Konitzer was sacked and arrested,
and by 22 April he was dead.
As real as these divisions were, those between the SPD and KPD members and their non-political colleagues were
often deeper. Minutes of meetings and private correspondence contain details of repeated disagreements and open
hostilities. We have seen above that those upholding the apolitical ideal of medical practice essentially equated ‘Nazi
medicine’ with that of the communists and socialists. To both the KPD and SPD sets this equation was unacceptable.
A good illustration is an exchange at a meeting in November 1945 on the issue of doctors becoming organized within
the new trade unions. The debate centred on the question of whether the majority of German doctors were ready for
this kind of organization, and whether ex-Nazi Party members should be allowed to join. Max Klesse countered
objections by saying: ‘It is not that all doctors have to join the trade union. Why urge the Nazis anyway? It is crucial
that especially the left-wing doctors (Linksärzte) are admitted to the trade unions as quickly as possible, because they
are those who are most fed up. We have not had any representation since the one that cancelled Marxist doctors’
salaries. We urgently need our representation now.’ Hermann Bermann, the head of the medical affairs department,
warned about Klesse's proposals: the splitting of the medical profession into those in and those not in the trade unions
had to be prevented by all means; ‘[i]f and when we join, we must all join’.  To Klesse's outraged reply that there
could be no compulsion, Bermann answered: ‘There must be a compulsory organization, otherwise nothing will ever
be achieved for the doctor.’ To Klesse, whose political allegiances came before the membership of any professional
club, this unity of the medical profession was a myth, at least since 1933.  In contrast, the non-political doctors
thought that ‘by joining trade unions they would be sucked into the minefield of far-left politics’.
Klesse's letters also reveal regular run-ins which were often not even about specific issues so much as a more general
kind of loathing. In May 1946 he complained to Zetkin and Schölmerich about Friedrich von Bergmann, who had
since 1938 been active as a doctor of the Sturmabteilung (SA) and now headed the sciences department of the ZVG.
Klesse suspected that the delays and seeming incompetence of Bergmann's department masked a deliberate boycott
and sabotage of the ‘progressive’ doctors’ input. Bergmann, he wrote, ‘who systematically sabotages our work, slows
it down or messes it up, must in my opinion be replaced soon if Dept. 1 is to achieve anything. If it was not for my
duty as a socialist to help you and hold out for your sake in this outfit, at least until enough new socialists can be
found, I would have long preferred to re-open my practice instead of being annoyed all the time by this damn
bourgeois and harmful windbag. At any rate, he probably arranges things deliberately (or out of stupidity?) in such a
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On this particular occasion, Klesse explained in a letter to Konitzer, Bergmann and others had made snide comments
on his ‘Marxist tendencies’, and, more seriously, had boycotted his proposals for creating new courses in social
pathology. Bergmann's work methods and his ‘constant sabotage of any kind of education of doctors according to
socialist principles’ had driven Klesse to open dispute. Bergmann's behaviour in the past, he said, had been ‘at the
same time petty-minded and unreasonable as much as stupid and arrogant, as only a bourgeois can be!’ Klesse also
resented that ‘the bourgeois Bruno Harms’ had tried to take sides (obviously not Klesse's), since Harms ‘can hardly
comprehend the disagreements of a socialist with a bourgeois’.  At exactly the same time Harms gave evidence for
Sauerbruch and joined the Magistrat Health Department (see above).
In March 1946, Klesse informed Zetkin that he would resign from the ZVG. While he had enjoyed working with the
comrades, he wrote, the daily frustrations caused by the regular clashes were becoming too much. He wanted to inform
Zetkin in advance so that a socialist could be found as his replacement. People like Harms, Bergmann, and Friedrich
Bentzin (a long-standing military doctor who now headed a sub-department and was a friend of Bergmann's ) must
not, Klesse insisted, be allowed to gain the upper hand: ‘apart from you [Zetkin], Schölmerich, Lettow and Lindenberg
I cannot see any determined men who could when necessary stand against these growing reactionary circles’.  To fill
important positions with ‘active army officers à la Benzin [Bentzin] is absolutely unacceptable from the socialist
perspective, since they will change the character of the whole ZVG, first only in individual departments, but
increasingly also in its entirety’.  On this occasion Zetkin persuaded Klesse to stay, and told him that he could not
afford to lose any socialists. In January 1947, when Klesse actually resigned, Zetkin reiterated that it was important
that ‘we have as many socialists in the system as possible’, given that in the impending reorganization following
Konitzer's demise a non-socialist might take over as president of the ZVG.
In contrast to the Magistrat personnel, the KPD and SPD health officers of the ZVG wrote and thought very differently
both about their past careers and present responsibilities. Magistrat health officers characterized their ideal medicine as
stripped of all party politics, and detected antecedents of this apolitical medical practice in their own careers and in
German medical traditions. In contrast, the SPD and KPD personnel identified a history of German political-medical
activism which was also in part exemplified by their own careers. While working as medical officers, many had argued
that the doctors, the natural advocates of the sick and needy, had to tackle not just the symptoms but also the social
causes of illness and disease. In 1928 Friedrich Wolf argued that the living conditions in the proletarian inner-city
districts of Berlin were directly responsible for their high rates of tuberculosis and infant mortality. Because these
living conditions were a reflection of their economic situation, Wolf insisted that the engaged doctor's job could not
simply consist in vaccinating or handing out drugs. Doctors had to educate the working class, press for both smaller
and more substantial social reforms, and ultimately help to bring about a proletarian revolution.  Of course, there
were disagreements on whether they were primarily to represent the revolutionary proletariat, the socialist state, or
insurance schemes, but all had clearly identified political, not merely medical, responsibilities.
Their argument on the political role of doctors acquired a new dimension with the rise of Nazism, often articulated in
articles of the International Medical Bulletin—a journal founded by a long-term member of the Association of
Socialist Doctors, Ewald Fabian, and published in Prague from 1934 until the annexation of the Sudetenland in 1938,
then in Paris from 1938 until mid-1939.  Apart from reports on the persecution of Jewish doctors and the
dismantling of progressive welfare and health institutions in Germany, the journal published clear statements on the
political dimension of doctors’ work. Its first issue contained a manifesto, which proclaimed: ‘Socialist doctors want to
contribute to making the proletariat physically and psychologically fit for the struggle of its liberation. The feeling of
solidarity drives the socialist doctors to the side of the struggling proletariat, which has in capitalism seen the deepest
misery and wretchedness and which wants to liberate humanity from this monstrous system by fighting for socialism.’
The socialist doctors now had to prevent the expansion of the Hitler regime, to educate people on the dangers of
fascism, and to fight against Nazi pseudoscience.
The same issue published an outraged reply to Sauerbruch's open letter of 1934 (see section on the Magistrat), signed
by a group of German social democratic doctors in Czechoslovakia and some other organizations from across the
world. Sauerbruch had written on the apolitical task of doctors, and had urged the ‘nationally rooted’ German medical
profession to support the new Nazi government. Compassion and helpfulness rather than political judgement must be
doctors’ only motivation, he had said. Their task was to ensure that the German government could continue to work in
peace. The émigrés replied: ‘we socialist doctors of all countries have always believed in the cultural ties of the people.
Compassion and helpfulness are not only the motor of our profession but also of our political drive, and we have
always wanted peace. We have done more: by working within the socialist parties we have served peace, have
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have stood for the study and acceptance of German medical achievements and the German health system.’  The
battle lines drawn here persisted in debates after 1945. The socialist doctors unequivocally condemned the Nazi
corruption of science and medicine and other doctors’ and scientists’ embrace of the Third Reich, but unlike
Sauerbruch and co. they did not agree that politics had to disappear from the realm of medicine per se, just the wrong
kind of politics.
This last passage also hints at another part of their self-characterization after 1945. Not only were they political agents,
but like Sauerbruch and Redeker they also saw themselves as part of a specifically German heritage. This was
expressed at meetings and in debates, where they regularly reminded each other of the importance of their past work in
public health administration. At the beginning, the social democrats were most vocal in this, and Konitzer and others
often emphasized their past professional experience on specific issues under discussion.  On one occasion, Konitzer
complained that the press coverage of issues such as federalism and regional self-administration was unsatisfactory.
These reports would be much more useful, he said, if they were to remind people of the rich administrative experience
and many useful older studies dating from before 1933, some of which he had helped to carry out. In contrast, ‘[t]he
ladies and gentlemen who are now entering the administration of the health service for the first time cannot know these
things as well’.
The importance of their identity as German health administrators was also made clear by Helmut Lehmann in reply to
what he perceived to be his colleagues’ over- reliance on Soviet power to get their proposals ratified. In a debate about
the relationship between regional and central administration of public health Lehmann was concerned about the
constitutional basis of giving the ZVG the power to interfere in Land health departments. Holling responded that he
could not see any constitutional problems, since these proposals were fully in accord with Soviet orders.  Lehmann
replied in frustration: ‘If you are only relying on Soviet orders, then you are right. But we are Germans and not
Russians. We want to present here our views and opinions on local government. This is what I have done, I do not
have to represent Russian viewpoints.’
In post-war analyses of the state of the public health service in the Soviet zone, many SPD health officers maintained
that it had become possible to pick up, improve, and expand many progressive ideas from the 1920s. In an article
celebrating the anniversary of the creation of the ZVG, Alfred Beyer argued that this organization was a direct
continuation of initiatives and schemes put forward by German medical officers in the 1920s, often not put into
practice at the time. He argued that the role of the Soviet authorities and their orders consisted, apart from the early
provision of food and vehicles, primarily in having made possible the implementation of these German concepts.
More subtly, Beyer's argument was also designed to enlist sceptical doctors in the reconstruction of the health service,
and to exonerate it from the accusation of having been imposed by Soviet officials.
Chief among the new features that were explained as the realization of older German schemes were the polyclinics:
outpatient facilities available to the general population, housing a range of medical specialists. The social democrat
Hermann Redetzky, who as head of the health department in Land Mecklenburg presided over the founding of the first
polyclinic in Schwerin in 1946, argued that the idea, the structure, and even the term had all been developed before the
Nazi era.  Other articles also presented the polyclinics as part of the German heritage. Decades earlier the
reorganization of medical treatment had been discussed by medical officers and social hygienists, wrote Edmund
Döring.  It was agreed then that medical care would improve if outpatient institutions, equipped with modern
apparatus (which, because of cost, were not easily available to individual practitioners), were opened. The Nazi period
had interrupted this development, but fortunately it could be taken up again after 1945.
In a much later article, but in similar terms, Hermann Redetzky and the communist Kurt Winter reflected on the early
post-war years. In the first decades of the twentieth century, they argued, the standard of German medical science had
been high and a number of progressive ideas had been advanced, but in most instances they could not be implemented.
However, after 1945 ‘we in Germany could base our efforts on a quite impressive tradition of ambulatory treatment.
Leading German social hygienists such as Grotjahn, Gottstein, and Lennhof had for decades insisted that the scientific
and technical development in medicine urgently demanded the creation of polyclinics. In 1923 and 1924 the Berlin
health insurance funds had created over 40 insured health centres which worked excellently.’
Polyclinics were just one of several ‘German’ ideas that were rediscovered after 1945. In a volume dedicated to the
role of Soviet orders in the reconstruction of the public health system, the editor Redetzky and many of the
contributors agreed on one point in particular: Soviet officials had not imported new ideas but helped to create
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initiatives to find and appoint those antifascist German doctors to the health service who knew the country and were
familiar with the German heritage.  Another major achievement of the Soviet officials was the establishment of the
ZVG. Overall, Redetzky argued, ‘[w]e have had in Germany, at least since the 1920s, a good and progressive tradition
in medicine with regard to social hygiene, the treatment of occupational diseases and the training of medical officers.
In those years, a series of progressive medical and welfare officers active in social hygiene had been achieving great
things in the lowering of infant mortality and in the battle against TB and VD.’ Infant mortality rates, TB, and VD
were all of renewed importance in the disaster conditions after the end of the war. Thus, these older approaches were
given a new lease of life after 1945, not least because the German medical officers had been able to work closely
together with their Soviet colleagues, publishing together and exchanging ideas. In fact, Redetzky thought that ‘among
our Soviet colleagues we have for long had a good name in these disciplines’.
This theme of German approaches and tools was also taken up by the communists.  Although communists and social
democrats agreed on the significance of their German heritage, the communist perspective was fraught with problems
not shared by the SPD set. In their past political careers they had embraced a party culture which included a
commitment to Marxist-Leninist theory and the communist cause, and loyalty to the Soviet Union. In practical terms,
during the 1920s and 1930s the Soviet Union had come to exert an increasing authority over the KPD, and, as Weitz
put it, ‘Moscow set overall strategy and broke and made KPD leaderships’. Most KPD functionaries had received their
technical and political training at one of the various institutes attached to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union
(CPSU), the Comintern, or the Red Army. Even before the extensive Stalinization of the KPD, German communists
had looked to the Russian revolution as the model that Germany would have to follow, and support of the Soviet Union
was a litmus test of loyalty.  To the officials presented here, the Soviet Union was more specifically a bastion of
progressive and socialized public health care. Felix Boenheim, Friedrich Wolf, Erwin Marcusson, and Maxim Zetkin
had all travelled to the USSR in the 1920s and 1930s, and had upon their returns written glowing appraisals of the
Soviet health system.
In 1945 a number of contradictory facets shaped the discussions among communists. Soviet loyalties were
strengthened by the fact that Soviet troops had helped to defeat the Hitler regime; many German communists also
believed that under Soviet occupation their long-held visions could finally be fulfilled. But conversely, comrades’
primary loyalties to the Soviet Union were tested. Many of those in Soviet exile had first-hand experience of the
Stalinist purges. Erwin Marcusson had spent 1938–40 in NKVD imprisonment.  Even for convinced German
communists it was not always easy to support and justify Soviet actions in Germany, associated as they were with
raping and pillaging by out-of-control soldiers, the arbitrary use of power by local commandants, and a policy of
reparations and economic dismantlement. And on a personal level, Soviet support of deserving comrades often seemed
to be lacking.
Despite the KPD's often inherent Soviet worship, there was a nationalist component to its early post-war work.
Throughout the previous decade, it had attempted (both out of political conviction and for reasons of political
expediency) to present the party as the leaders of an antifascist and national front, and their preparations had
emphasized their role as defenders of the German nation. Stalin himself had pointed to the strategic importance of this
position. According to Dimitrov, he had for years argued that communist parties across the world should loosen their
ties with the Communist International and turn themselves into ‘national parties’: ‘What matters is that they put down
roots in their own peoples and concentrate on their own proper tasks. They ought to have a Com[munist] programme;
they should proceed on a Marxist analysis, but without looking over their shoulders at Moscow; they should resolve
the concrete problems they face in the given countries independently. And the situation and problems in different
countries are altogether different. In England there are certain ones, in Germany there are different ones, and so
forth.’
The dissolution of the Comintern (officially in May 1943), Stalin argued, would strengthen their role as ‘national
working-class parties’.  In June 1945, when the KPD tried to present a kind of socialism that would be acceptable to
the German population, Stalin advised Dimitrov and the German comrades on exactly these lines. A diary entry by
Dimitrov stated: ‘Stalin proposed: declare categorically that the path of imposing the Sov[iet] system on Germany is an
incorrect one; an antifascist democratic parliamentary regime must be established. The Com[munist] Party proposed a
bloc of antifascist parties with a common platform. Don’t speak so glowingly of the Sov[iet] Union, and so on.’
Given these contradictions, there was considerable fluidity in debates of the early post-war years. Some in the KPD
insisted that the primary task was the immediate construction of a socialist Germany along the Soviet model. But, at
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emphasized the particularities of the German situation. A KPD appeal of 11 June 1945 (a few days after Dimitrov's
diary entry above) called for the establishment of an antifascist, democratic Germany, and stated that the Soviet model
was, for the moment at least, inappropriate. A new way had to be found to take account of the national peculiarities of
Germany. The failed German revolution of 1848 should become the new point of reference, and should be, almost a
hundred years later, finally completed.
In an article in early 1946, the leading KPD official Anton Ackermann developed the concept of a ‘special German
road to socialism’. Using references to Marx, Engels, and Lenin, he argued that socialism in Germany could be
achieved without the military confrontations and accompanying civil war of the October revolution. There could be a
distinctively German path of development.  In language at least in part designed to soothe the worries of those who
feared the coming of a Soviet Germany, he explained on a later occasion: ‘The culture of a nation cannot and should
not be exported to a different country … As a result, the culture of a future socialist Germany will not be a copy of
other nation's cultures, but take its own specific national form.’  In presentations of this German communism, the
historical reference point was no longer the Bolshevik revolution, but the failed German revolutions of 1919 and 1848.
In August 1948, as the differences between the occupiers had widened and the Cold War was in full swing, the SED
abandoned the ‘German road’ and its propaganda fell in line behind the Soviet model.  Nonetheless, the strategic
importance of the attempt to convince the German population of the viability of a German communist programme can
hardly be overstated. It was particularly important baggage for the KPD officials in the ZVG. Like their SPD
colleagues, they emphasized the importance of their German heritage, and continued to do so after 1948. For public
health and medicine, they argued, German traditions, rather than a sudden Soviet orientation, were most crucial. But in
terms often not shared in this form with the SPD doctors, they explained that their own interpretations of the political-
medical mission had in fact continued a much older, but until now always marginalized, tradition of political medical
engagement in Germany. While Redetzky and Konitzer primarily focused on the achievements of the 1920s, to
communists such as Winter and Boenheim the failed German revolution of 1848 now became the crucial orientation
point. Often this was only a difference of emphasis—of course, the communists also commemorated the 1920s
‘progressive’ advances, and on occasion Beyer and others also wrote about the symbolic significance of 1848 (see (iii)
Rudolf Virchow (version 2)). But even if the social democrats could sympathize, for the communists the uncompleted
revolution of 1848 became a particularly crucial marker.
(iii) Rudolf Virchow (version 2)
Early versions of an emphasis on 1848 can be found in the International Medical Bulletin. In a 1935 article, Ewald
Fabian (writing under the pseudonym of E. Silva) analysed the role of doctors in past struggles for freedom. In the
Austrian freedom movement of 1848, in the Bolshevik revolution, and now in Spain, he claimed, doctors had always
taken leading parts. Although German doctors were now failing miserably, in 1848 heroic figures such as Rudolf
Virchow had risked their lives for ‘great historical progress’. These figures, Fabian went on, must become role models
for German doctors of the present, and inspire them to fight against the Nazi dictatorship.  An anonymous article
from 1936 presented Rudolf Virchow as a fighter for truth, freedom, and enlightenment: in the early 1880s, as anti-
Semitism in Berlin was rife, Virchow was one of the organizers of a well-attended rally against anti-Semitism, which
demanded equality and an end to religious hatred.
After 1945, celebrations of the revolutionary Rudolf Virchow were particularly pervasive among communist members
of the ZVG. In striking contrast to the portrayals discussed earlier, studies and biographical essays focused almost
exclusively on Virchow's role in the 1848 revolution in Berlin. Two examples of publications from the early 1950s sum
up the communist assessment.
First, Kurt Winter's biography of Rudolf Virchow celebrated Virchow as a great revolutionary role model and idol.
Virchow lacked proper Marxist understanding of the historical role of the working class, Winter admitted, but he still
had fought for the rights of workers and against Prussian feudalism, demonstrating that his heart was in the right place.
Early in 1848, Winter wrote, Virchow had been appointed by the Prussian government to investigate an outbreak of
typhoid fever in Upper Silesia. His subsequent report blamed the social and material conditions of the Silesian
population and government neglect for the outbreak. Eight days after his return from Silesia, Virchow fought in the
Berlin uprising. Winter thought both points worth celebrating. ‘It is an honour not just to Virchow but to German
sciences as a whole’, Winter argued, ‘that one of its greatest representatives had the courage to support the just cause
of the Polish people … It has to be the doctor's task to do all he can in the solution of social problems, especially
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representative of German science and a real patriot, but he had realized that real patriotism meant an appreciation of
other peoples. In his report, Virchow demonstrated ‘the close association between politics and medicine. With
contempt he turned against all those who hid behind their science, against all those “only”-scientists who had no
courage to support a just cause because this might involve personal sacrifices.’  Winter argued that Virchow's
political interest and his appreciation of social hygiene and social policy issues were particularly closely intertwined,
and his demands were only finally fulfilled in the East German social security system.
Second, Felix Boenheim's biographical essay on Virchow contained a similar kind of analysis, in a more measured and
critical tone.  Unlike Winter, Boenheim saw Virchow's revolutionary engagement as a brief, but crucial, episode in
his life. The government had suspended him from his post at the Charité following the March rising, but he was soon
reinstated and also found another position in Würzburg. By 1849, Boenheim argued, Virchow had returned to
‘bourgeois security’. He had not studied or understood the implication of Marxist teachings, and as a result his
arguments on social reform had ultimately been superficial. Nevertheless, Boenheim agreed that Virchow in his early
career had been a revolutionary. Virchow, along with other progressive or humanist doctors, had been led to politics
because of his patients’ social misery. They had realized that the fulfilment of their medical tasks demanded
participation in politics and a solution to social problems. As a result, he was one of the liberal bourgeois men who
fought in 1848 and acted as advocate of the working classes, however briefly, and showed faith in the oppressed people
of Silesia. Virchow had recognized the link between social and medical conditions by understanding that medical
reforms always had to involve social and political reform. All this had been particularly obvious in his investigation of
the Polish health question, Boenheim thought, where he had not shied away from drawing explicitly political
conclusions. Although he then sold out, Virchow's ideals and his courage lived on in the workers’ movement.
The difference in emphasis between communist and social democratic interpretations of Virchow becomes clear if we
look at Alfred Beyer's portrayal of Virchow as a representative of true social democracy.  In an article from February
1946, published in the ZVG's journal, Beyer argued that the meaning and significance of democracy, unclear in many
Germans’ minds, could be illustrated by the ‘fighting democrat’ Virchow. His character had been so fundamentally
democratic and threatening to authoritarians, Beyer claimed, that Virchow had not only been unpopular with the older
generation of German medical researchers at the time, but the Nazis had denounced him in a popular film.  In his
report on Upper Silesia, Virchow had not recommended purely medical measures, but political cures, such as
democracy, education, freedom, and prosperity.  He had demanded broad social reforms: full employment, the
construction of streets and factories, fairer taxes, and better nutrition. All in all, Beyer proclaimed, this was ‘a truly
democratic programme, and one which is still of relevance today!’
During the 1848 revolution in Berlin, Beyer went on, Virchow had worked for a democratic reform of the out-of-date
university constitution, and the creation of a central health ministry, the introduction of hygiene as part of the medical
curriculum, the creation of insurance funds, and an eight-hour working day. As a true patriot and a fighter for the
freedom of the whole German people, Virchow later demanded from Bismarck that Junker power must be curbed. His
democratic conception was also evident in his scientific theories, Beyer claimed. Virchow had shown that cells were
the basic unit of life, but he had also demonstrated that cells could not exist on their own—groups of cells formed
organs, and groups of organs formed organisms. All this was mirrored in society, where individuals as the most basic
unit also could not exist on their own, and therefore came together in a democratically governed and ordered state.
Overall, Beyer proclaimed, Virchow's ‘life was dedicated to his people. He worked, taught, lived and strove as a model
for true democracy; unwavering and incorruptible, brave, tireless and selfless.’  And his model of social democracy
was of particular relevance for today: ‘Given the incomparably heavier burden which we have to carry today, given the
hard to appreciate variety and the importance of the tasks which we have to tackle quickly and decisively if we want to
carry on living, democracy is the best type of state, since it survives particularly long-lasting, difficult and almost
hopeless struggles most securely.’
A few months later, the same journal contained an article by Robert von Radetzky which talked about Virchow in very
similar terms.  Virchow was the voice of the ‘German democratic medical profession’ today, Radetzky argued, since
he had ‘crowned the designs of a healthy social policy with the concept of a social health policy’, and he stood for the
aims of the failed 1848 revolution which were now finally going to be fulfilled.
This emphasis on a German heritage, demonstrating a close connection between medical and political engagement,
was crucial for several reasons. It was a means for recruiting apolitical German doctors and medical officers to work
with the ZVG on the basis of these shared traditions, and of exonerating it from the accusation of Soviet influence.
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in the SPD or KPD the lack of such political-medical engagement served as a yardstick to judge German doctors’
involvement in the Nazi regime. Friedrich Wolf's response to doctors who argued for ‘the rights of the unborn’ in the
debate about abortion legislation after 1945 made this particularly clear: ‘Where were these doctors, my colleagues,’
Wolf asked,
in the years 1933–1945 when ‘Germanic sciences’ demanded and barbarically practised the sterilization of
thousands of political or ‘racial’ enemies—Germans, slave labourers from Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia,
Russia, and even France? Did those doctors who are so sensitive and ethical today raise their voices and defend
the ‘sanctity of life’ and ‘the right of the unborn’? These philistines! In the face of the medical crimes in Dachau,
Hadamer, Ravensbrück, etc. I deny my German colleagues the right to use those arguments unless they had the
courage and the conscience to use them during the Nazi regime!
This political-medical emphasis also had an educational dimension. It was seen as a useful tool both for teaching the
population at large about socialist programmes, and for training young doctors (particularly those who had only
recently completed their medical training and who still lacked professional experience) in the aims and advantages of a
particular conception of medicine and the German heritage.
Conclusions
The German medical profession was deeply divided when the Allies arrived in Germany, and these divisions became
more acute through the Allied presence and the political context of the post-war years. Perhaps nowhere were these
divisions as visible as in a contrast of the two very different health offices presented here: Sauerbruch, Gohrbandt, and
Redeker on the one side and Zetkin, Konitzer, and Klesse on the other. They had fundamentally dissimilar perspectives
on their jobs, medical and public health practice, and German history and traditions. The self-proclaimed non-political
doctors argued that they had remained true to scientific values and medical ethics and were uncontaminated by
political concerns. While the Nazi regime may have corrupted medicine by subordinating it to crude political aims,
this, they insisted, was all the more evidence for the need to guarantee that the medical profession stayed free from
future political interference. The politically engaged doctors and medical officers, on the other hand, argued that they
had never lost touch with social reform efforts, which had to form a central component of any medical work. The post-
war programmes had to attempt to re-educate the German population, remove its militarist and fascist elements, tackle
social inequalities, and build a new kind of German society—and doctors were crucial for the fulfilment of these tasks.
These competing portrayals partly reflected different biographies, careers, and interests, but particularly for the first set
this was often also a convenient way of absolving individuals from any question of guilt or responsibility, and
defending the existing status quo and medical establishment.
In Berlin, these clashes were particularly potent. Under sole Soviet control until July 1945, the bulk of reappointments
took place without any input from the other three occupiers. The appointments document a dual Soviet strategy of
dealing with German doctors: one of appeasement, allowing them to operate with little interference and few reprisals
for their pasts; and the other of re-educating and remoulding German institutions, and advancing those Germans who
were supportive of Soviet aims. The first approach could help to reduce the economic burden of the occupation and aid
the Soviet exploitation of German science and medicine; the second had political and security benefits, as growing
insecurity over the future of Allied relations began to change Soviet priorities. As Part II will show, the other
occupiers, too, shared contradictory approaches to German doctors and health officials. The coexistence of these
strategies ultimately represented the breakdown of planners’ assumptions and the failure of vital occupation agendas.
While Berlin was intended to stand for the quadripartite occupation by the Allied victors, it soon became a symbol of
their disunity.
German doctors and health officers had radically competing ideas and attempted to influence the occupiers
accordingly. They fought over the governance of the medical profession, the function of public health, and the future of
their work. But they had things in common. Where the non-political doctors represented German medical dynasties
(especially by having trained with famous individuals or having taken on their university chairs), the socialist doctors
stood for German political dynasties (as in Boenheim's, Zadek's, and Zetkin's families, but also in their party
allegiances). Despite significant differences, they all shared a focus on German developments before 1933. They
identified national traditions and a particular German way of doing things, and pointed to German founding fathers.
Even among those Germans who were vocal supporters of the Soviet occupation there was a strong sense of German
identity, and Soviet role models were often scarce.
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The biographies of figures such as Rudolf Virchow that were newly published or rereleased after 1945 were partly
attempts by the medical profession to protect itself and its public image. The writers tried to find legitimate past
traditions and presented themselves as the best representatives of those traditions. But although they shared idols such
as Virchow, they were seeing something very different in this past: where the communists detected the beginnings of
bourgeois social reform and proletarian German revolution, the social democrats identified the seeds of social
democracy, while the medical men of the Charité celebrated the peak of ‘apolitical’ German bacteriological science.
For all, it demonstrated that the Nazi period was an ‘aberration’, and that the portrayal of the German people as
inherently militarized, authoritarian, and undemocratic was wrong.
Despite such claims on the aberration of the Nazi years, there was considerable continuity across the 1945 divide. In
the realm of public health a number of institutions and their personnel survived the defeat utterly unchanged, often in
spite of vocal protests to the contrary. Jeffrey Herf and others have written about the nature of post-war German
memory and the construction of narratives. Herf has argued that, faced by the crisis of defeat and social collapse, the
restoration of past traditions offered Germans the ‘possibility of making sense of the chaos and confusion around
them’.  This chapter shows that the significance of these German traditions extended far beyond the realm of
individual psychology. To the medical profession, which had so much to lose following the publicity of Nazi medical
crimes, the identification and celebration of good German traditions had the double purpose of presenting a new
starting point which radically broke with the Nazi so-called interlude, and of absolving the carriers of this tradition
from any tarnish. These positive traditions became a crucial instrument of the profession's legitimacy and credibility.
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Figure 4.2.
Top: Stamps from the series Personalities in politics, the arts and science (Deutsche Post, German Democratic
Republic, 1952). Virchow features here among grandees of German Communism such as Karl Marx, Friedrich
Engels, August Bebel and G. W. Hegel.
Bottom: Stamps from the series 150 years Humboldt University – 250 years Charité (Deutsche Post, German
Democratic Republic, 1960)
Virchow also featured in other commemorative stamp series, such as Men from the history of Berlin (Deutsche Post
Berlin, 1952; and Deutsche Bundespost Berlin, 1957)
This material is not covered by the Creative Commons licence terms that govern the reuse of this publication. For
permission to reuse please contact the rights holder directly.
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Tables
Table 4.1. Heads of Department in the Central Health Administration of the Soviet Occupation
Zone, October to December 1945
OCTOBER 1945 DECEMBER 1945
President Dr Paul Konitzer (Aug. 45–
Feb. 47) SPD
President Dr Paul Konitzer (Aug. 45–Feb.
47) SPD
1st Vice-president Dr Ignatz Zadek (Aug.–Nov.
45) SPD
1st Vice-president Dr Maxim Zetkin (Dec. 45–49)
KPD
2nd Vice-president Dr Fritz Leo/Lettow KPD
(Aug. 45–?)
2nd Vice-president Dr Ignatz Zadek (Dec. 45–Feb.
46) SPD
3rd Vice-president None 3rd Vice-president Dr Bruno Harms (Dec. 45–July
46) DDP/LPD
Administration Dr Paul Konitzer SPD General Administration Dr Joseph Schölmerich
(Scholmer) KPD
1. Sciences Dr Friedrich v. Bergmann 1. Sciences Dr Friedrich v. Bergmann
2. Secretariat Dr Werner Holling 2. Secretariat/Legal
Department
Dr Werner Holling
3. Human Resources Dr Fritz Leo/Lettow KPD 3. Human Resources Dr Fritz Leo/Lettow KPD
4. Economy & Finances Dr Erich Taeger 4. Finances &
Economy
Dr Erich Taeger
5. Mother & Child Dr Anneliese Hamann KPD 5. Mother & Child Dr Anneliese Hamann KPD
6. Preventive Medical
Care
Dr Fabian SPD 6. Preventive Medical
Care
Dr Max Klesse SPD
7. Social Care Dr Alfred Beyer SPD 7. Social Care Dr Alfred Beyer SPD
8. Medical Affairs Dr Hermann Bermann 8. Medical Affairs Dr Hermann Bermann
9. Food & Consumption
Hygiene
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Table 4.2. Heads of Department in the Central Health Administration of the Soviet Occupation
Zone, April to September 1946
2 April 1946 1 September 1946
















Dr Joseph Schölmerich (Scholmer) KPD
Deputy: Robert v. Radetzky
1. Sciences Dr Otto Jäger
1. Sciences Dr Friedrich v. Bergmann no deputy 2. Organization Dr Carl Coutelle KPD/SED




















Dr Anneliese Hamann KPD no deputy 6. Medical Care Dr Erich Schäfer
6. Preventive
Medical Care




Dr Max Klesse SPD/SED
7. Social
Medicine





















Willi Mueller Deputy: Theodor Kluge
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Table 4.3. Heads of Department in the Central Health Administration of the Soviet Occupation
Zone, September 1947 to October 1948
September 1947 October 1948
President Dr Karl Linser (Feb. 47–Nov.
48)
President Dr Karl Linser (Feb. 47–
Nov. 48)
1st Vice-president Dr Maxim Zetkin (Dec. 45–49)
KPD/SED
1st Vice-president Dr Maxim Zetkin (Dec. 45–
49) KPD/SED
2nd Vice-president Dr Alfred Beyer (Mar. 46–Nov.
48) SPD/SED
2nd Vice-president Dr Alfred Beyer (Mar. 46–
Nov. 48) SPD/SED
3rd Vice-president Dr Barbara v. Renthe-Fink (Feb.
47–June 48) SPD/SED
3rd Vice-president Dr Kurt Winter (June 48–
49) KPD/SED
1. Sciences Dr Otto Jäger 1. General Department Dr Walter Axel (Fräser)
Friedeberger SPD/SED
2. Organization & Planning Dr Rudolf Neumann KPD/SED 2. Training & Personnel Dr Carl Coutelle KPD/SED
3. Medical Profession Dr Carl Coutelle KPD/SED 3. Medical &
Preventive Health Care
Dr Erich Schäfer
4. Finances & Economy Feuerboether 4. General Hygiene &
Epidemic Control
Dr Johannes Kathe
5. Statistics & Information Dr Eva Schmidt-Kolmer
KPÖ/SED
5. Medical Research &
Training
Dr Richard Wegener








9. Food Inspection &
Control
Dr Georg Wundram
10. Medical Industry &
Pharmaceutical Affairs
Willi Mueller
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